Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Quantum key distribution (QKD)^[@CR1],[@CR2]^ provides a secret key shared between two remote legitimate parties with information-theoretic security, enabling private communication regardless of an adversary's computational power and advanced hardware technology. It also has a welcome feature that, for a simple prepare-and-measure type of QKD protocols, the sender's and the receiver's device can be implemented with current technology such as lasers, linear optics components, and photon detectors. A drawback is a limitation on the key generation rate stemming from the loss in the channel. For a direct link from the sender to the receiver, the key rate cannot surpass the loss bounds^[@CR3],[@CR4]^ of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\eta$$\end{document}$ is the single-photon transmissivity of the link. Although quantum repeaters^[@CR5]^ are known to beat this limitation by placing untrusted intermediate stations to segment the link, the required technology to manipulate quantum states is demanding. Early proposals to mitigate this demand to beat the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$O(\eta )$$\end{document}$ scaling still requires quantum memories^[@CR6]^ or quantum non-demolition (QND) measurements^[@CR7]^, which are currently in the developing stage.

Surprisingly, possibility of achieving an $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$O\left( {\sqrt \eta } \right)$$\end{document}$ scaling with current technology was recently proposed^[@CR8]^ as a protocol called twin-field (TF) QKD, a variant of the measurement-device independent (MDI) protocols^[@CR9]^. In this protocol, an untrusted station Charlie sitting midway between Alice and Bob simply conducts an interference measurement to learn the relative phase between the pulse pair sent from Alice and Bob. On the surface, the scaling may be understood from the interpretation that a photon detected by Charlie has traveled either the Alice-Charlie segment or the Bob-Charlie segment with transmissivity $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\sqrt \eta$$\end{document}$. But a similar phase encoding scheme was already adopted in an earlier MDI-QKD protocol^[@CR10]^, which did not achieve the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$O\left( {\sqrt \eta } \right)$$\end{document}$ scaling. The essential point lies elsewhere, in how Alice and Bob can monitor the adversary's attack on the link and on Charlie's apparatus. For this purpose, the TF QKD was specifically designed so as to attain the compatibility to the standard decoy-state method^[@CR11]--[@CR13]^, which have been successfully used in other QKD protocols.

As the original proposal^[@CR8]^ lacked a rigorous security proof, many intensive studies^[@CR14]--[@CR21]^ have been devoted to achieving information-theoretic proofs of variants of TF QKD^[@CR15]--[@CR17]^ and a family of similar protocols called phase-matching (PM) QKD^[@CR14],[@CR18]--[@CR21]^. As was the case for other QKD protocols, these first proofs mainly consider the asymptotic regime. All the key rates shown to beat the loss bounds so far are achievable only in the limit of infinitely large number of pulses being sent. Explicit formulation in the finite-size regime is found only in the work of Tamaki et al.^[@CR15]^, but this early proposal barely surpasses the loss bounds even in the asymptotic limit, and no numerical values were given for finite-size effect. Hence, at this point, we have totally no clue on how long one must run a QKD protocol on end to beat the loss bounds. It could be hours, days, or even longer.

We should also be aware that the finite-size regime is not a mere appendage to the asymptotic regime. In the latter regime, the fraction of the communication time devoted to the monitoring of the adversary is assumed to be negligible. This implies that one is allowed to invest an infinite resource to the monitoring with no penalty, despite the fact that the monitoring is the main obstacle in the TF-type protocols. In fact, the protocol by Lin and Lütkenhaus^[@CR20]^, which attains both the simplest of the proofs and the highest of the asymptotic key rates, adopts a newly proposed generalization of the decoy-state method for a complete characterization of the adversary's act, by using the set of test states composed of coherent states with every complex amplitude. Although it gives a lucid view on the problem, it is probably not the shortest route to answer the ultimate question of whether one can find a protocol with information-theoretic security to beat the loss bounds with current technology.

Here we positively answer to the above question by proposing a variant of PM-QKD protocol equipped with a simple security proof in the finite-size regime. Our protocol also involves a kind of extension of the standard decoy-state method, but interestingly, its direction is the opposite of the generalization by Lin and Lütkenhaus: we try to learn about the adversary's act as little as possible except the parameter crucial for the security. For this purpose, we construct a minimal set of test states to satisfy an operator inequality, which we call an operator dominance condition. Our method drastically simplifies the analysis of the finite-size effect to just a double use of classical Bernoulli sampling.

Results {#Sec2}
=======

Proposed protocol {#Sec3}
-----------------

The setup for our proposed protocol is illustrated in Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}. In order to distribute a secure key, Alice and Bob both send optical pulses to Charlie, the central untrusted station. Each of the senders randomly switches between the signal mode and the test mode. They use the signal mode for accumulating raw key bits and the test mode for monitoring the amount of leak.Fig. 1Illustration of the proposed quantum key distribution protocol. In the signal mode, Alice and Bob each encode their random bits on phase-locked pulses with intensity (mean photon number) *μ* through phase modulators (PMODs). In the test mode, they independently randomize the optical phase *θ* and switch among three intensities 0, *μ*~1~, and *μ*~2~. The central station Charlie, who may be in control of an adversary, announces whether his detection has succeeded and if it has, he further announces whether he has found the pulse pair to be in-phase or anti-phase. Bob flips his bit when anti-phase was announced

The signal mode is based on the PM-QKD protocol^[@CR14]^, which is common to previous proposals^[@CR18]--[@CR21]^. We assume Alice and Bob have phase-locked pulse sources to generate in-phase pulses. Each party encodes a random bit by applying 0 or *π* phase shift to the pulse with a fixed intensity *μ* (defined in terms of its mean photon number) and sends it to Charlie. He measures and announces whether the two pulses are in-phase or anti-phase, by using a 50:50 beam-splitter and a pair of photon detectors. Successful detection at Charlie allows Alice and Bob to learn whether their bits have the same or different values. Thus, by appropriately flipping Bob's bits, Alice, and Bob can accumulate shared random bits by repetition, which we call sifted keys.

As in refs. ^[@CR19],[@CR21]^, we associate the amount of leak to the phase errors in an equivalent protocol in which Alice and Bob use auxiliary qubits A and B. Let us call $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\left\{ {\left. {|0} \right\rangle ,\left. {|1} \right\rangle } \right\}$$\end{document}$ the *Z* basis of a qubit, and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Suppose that Charlie has declared *K*~0~ detected rounds after the repetition. This leaves the corresponding *K*~0~ pairs of qubits at Alice and Bob. If they measure the qubits in the *Z* basis, they obtain *K*~0~-bit sifted keys in the actual protocol. To assess the amount of leak in the sifted keys, we consider a virtual protocol in which they measure the qubits in the *X* basis instead and count the number of phase errors (*X* errors) among the *K*~0~ pairs. Here an *X* error is defined to be an event where the pair was found in either state $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$K_0^{({\mathrm{even}})}/K_0$$\end{document}$ is low, it implies that the leak on the sifted keys is small. Hence, the aim of the test mode is to gather data to compute a good upper bound *e*~ph~ on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$K_0^{({\mathrm{even}})}/K_0$$\end{document}$. In the asymptotic limit, shortening by fraction *h*(*e*~ph~) via privacy amplification achieves the security^[@CR22],[@CR23]^, where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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To obtain a good intuition on the meaning of the observable $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$K_0^{({\mathrm{even}})}$$\end{document}$ in the virtual protocol, consider a scenario in which Alice and Bob make the *X* basis measurements before sending out the optical pulses. Notice that the state (Eq. [1](#Equ1){ref-type=""}) is rewritten as$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\rho ^{({\mathrm{even}})}$$\end{document}$, the total number of photons in the pulse pair is always even. Hence, the number $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$K_0^{({\mathrm{even}})}$$\end{document}$ can be interpreted as the frequency of detection when the total emitted photon number of the pulse pair was even.

The main question is how we should design the test mode to estimate the number $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\rho ^{({\mathrm{even}})}$$\end{document}$ as was proposed recently^[@CR21]^, but generation of such a non-classical optical state with a good fidelity will be hard to realize in current technology. For the use of laser pulses, previous approaches^[@CR18],[@CR19]^ for the asymptotic regime use the standard decoy-state method in which various detection rates labeled by emitted photon numbers are estimated. A bound on the phase error rate is then computed from those rates through a set of inequalities. Lin and Lütkenhaus^[@CR20]^ generalized the decoy-state method to a kind of tomography, in which case tight estimation of phase error rate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Based on the above design policy, we found the following potocol (see Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}).Alice chooses a label from {"0", "10", "11", "2"} with probabilities *p*~0~, *p*~10~, *p*~11~, and *p*~2~, respectively. According to the label, Alice performs one of the following procedures."0": She generates a random bit *a* and sends a pulse with amplitude $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$( - 1)^a\sqrt \mu$$\end{document}$."10": She sends the vacuum."11": She sends a phase-randomized pulse with intensity *μ*~1~."2": She sends a phase-randomized pulse with intensity *μ*~2~.Bob independently carries out the same procedure as Alice in Step 1.Alice and Bob repeat Steps 1 and 2 in total of *N*~tot~ times.For every pair of pulses received from Alice and Bob, Charlie announces whether the phase difference was successfully detected. When it was detected, he further announces whether it was in-phase or anti-phase.Alice and Bob disclose their label choices. Let *K*~0~ be the number of detected rounds for which both Alice and Bob chose "0". Alice concatenates the random bits for the *K*~0~ rounds to define her sifted key. Bob defines his sifted key in the same way except that he flips all the bits for the rounds declared to be anti-phase.Let *K*~10~, *K*~11~, and *K*~2~ be the number of detected rounds for which both Alice and Bob chose the same label "10", "11", and "2", respectively. Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Security proof {#Sec4}
--------------

In order to prove the security of the above protocol, we need to construct an upper bound on the phase error rate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We first clarify the meaning of numbers *K*~1~ and *K*~2~ collected in the test mode. By definition of the protocol, *K*~1~ is the frequency of detection when the pulse pair C~A~C~B~ was initially prepared in state $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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When Eq. ([9](#Equ9){ref-type=""}) holds, there exists a normalized state $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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This means that if Eq. ([7](#Equ7){ref-type=""}) is true in the modified scenario, it is also true in the virtual protocol.

From comparison between the first and the second rows in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}, we notice that *K*~2~ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The properties (i) and (ii) reduce the security proof to an elementary problem of classical random sampling. In an asymptotic limit of *K*~1~, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Numerical simulation {#Sec5}
--------------------

We simulated the key rate *G*/*N*~tot~ as a function of distance *L* between Alice and Bob when they are fiber-linked to Charlie with a loss of 0.2 dB/km. We assumed a detection efficiency of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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As an example, we present explict values of the optimized parameters for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Discussion {#Sec6}
==========

We proposed a variation of TF-type QKD protocol by using the signal mode of the PM-QKD protocol and the test mode specifically designed to simplify the estimation process of the amount of information leak. The simulated key rate shows that it beats the PLOB bound when the total number of pulse pairs emitted from Alice and Bob is 10^11^ to 10^12^, which corresponds to several to twenty minutes for a system of 1 GHz pulse repetition. It amounts to settling down the conjecture with a comprehensive information-theoretic security proof covering the finite-size key regime.

In the protocol, the events where Alice and Bob have chosen different local labels are simply discarded. It is an interesting question whether we may improve the key rate by incorporating the detection frequencies of such events in the analysis. Conversely, by accepting a lower key rate, we may be able to simplify the protocol to use only three intensities $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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An essential ingredient of our design is the operator dominance method of estimating the detection frequency of one state from those of a combination of different test states. We can identify two instances of binomial distribution in a modified scenario, which simplifies the required statistical analysis in the finite-size regime. As a methodology, the number of test states forming the linear combination to approximate the target state does not affect the simplicity of analysis. As long as the operator dominance condition is satisfied, we can group the states with positive coefficients to define state $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Methods {#Sec7}
=======

Definition of security in the finite-size regime {#Sec8}
------------------------------------------------

We evaluate the secrecy of the final key as follows. When the final key length is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$G \ge 1$$\end{document}$, we represent Alice's final key and an adversary's quantum system as a joint state$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\rho _{{\mathrm{AE}}|G}^{{\mathrm{fin}}} = \mathop {\sum }\limits_{z = 0}^{2^G - 1} {\kern 1pt} {\mathrm{Prob}}(z)\left. {|z} \right\rangle \left\langle {z|} \right._{\mathrm{A}} \otimes \rho _{{\mathrm{E}}|G}^{{\mathrm{fin}}}(z),$$\end{document}$$and define the corresponding ideal state as$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\rho _{{\mathrm{AE}}|G}^{{\mathrm{ideal}}} = \mathop {\sum }\limits_{z = 0}^{2^G - 1} {\kern 1pt} 2^{ - G}\left. {|z} \right\rangle \left\langle {z|} \right._{\mathrm{A}} \otimes {\mathrm{Tr}}_{\mathrm{A}}\left( {\rho _{{\mathrm{AE}}|G}^{{\mathrm{fin}}}} \right).$$\end{document}$$Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\left\| \sigma \right\|_1 = {\mathrm{Tr}}\sqrt {\sigma ^{\mathrm{\dagger }}\sigma }$$\end{document}$ be the trace norm of an operator *σ*. We say a protocol is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\epsilon _{{\mathrm{sct}}}$$\end{document}$-secret when$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\frac{1}{2}{\kern 1pt} \mathop {\sum }\limits_{G \ge 1} {\kern 1pt} {\mathrm{Prob}}(G)\parallel \rho_{{\mathrm{AE}}|G}^{{\mathrm{fin}}} - \rho _{{\mathrm{AE}}|G}^{{\mathrm{ideal}}}\parallel _1 \le \epsilon _{{\mathrm{sct}}}$$\end{document}$$holds regardless of the adversary's attack. It is known^[@CR26]^ that if the number of phase errors is bounded as in Eq. ([7](#Equ7){ref-type=""}), the protocol is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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When the above two conditions are met, the protocol becomes $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Construction of operator dominance condition {#Sec9}
--------------------------------------------

Here we describe a procedure to compute parameter sets fulfilling the operator dominance condition (Eq. [9](#Equ9){ref-type=""}). Suppose that values of *μ*~1~, *μ*~2~, *p*~10~, and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The proof goes as follows. Using the representation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Bounds for a classical random sampling {#Sec10}
--------------------------------------
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### *Definition 1* {#FPar1}
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### *Lemma 1* {#FPar2}

Let *M* and *K* be random variables taking nonnegative integer values. If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Calculation of simulated key rates {#Sec11}
----------------------------------

For the simulation of the key rate *G*/*N*~tot~ as a function of distance between Alice and Bob, we adopted the following model for the channels and Charlie's detection apparatus. We assumed a fiber loss of 0.2 dB/km and a detection efficiency of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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